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Abstract
The problem of obtaining market-clearing prices for markets with non-convexities
has been widely studied in the literature. This is particularly the case in electric-
ity markets, where worldwide deregulation leads to markets in which non-convexities
arise from the decisions of market operators regarding which generators are committed
to provide electricity power. Here, we extend seminal results in this area to address
the problem of obtaining market-clearing prices for markets in which beyond non-
convexities, it is relevant to account for convex quadratic market costs. In a general
market, such costs arise from quadratic commodity costs or transactions costs. In an
electricity market, such quadratic costs arise when ramping costs need to be consid-
ered due to the presence of renewable energy sources, which continue to increase their
participation in electricity markets. To illustrate our results, we compute and analyze
the clearing prices of a classical market problem with the addition of ramping costs.
Keywords market-clearing prices, quadratic costs, ramping costs, unit commitment, mixed-
integer quadratic programming, renewable energy sources.
1 Introduction
The presence of non-convexities is inherent in markets due to economies of scale, start-up
and/or shut-down costs, avoidable costs, indivisibilities, and minimum supply requirements.
These non-convexities make the problem of finding appropriate prices that result in a market
equilibrium challenging. This issue has been addressed in classical work by Gomory and
Baumol (1960); Scarf (1990, 1994); Starr (1969). Continued work in this area has been
recently reviewed by Liberopoulos and Andrianesis (2016) and Van Vyve et al. (2011). Here,
we focus on considering the effect of not only non-convexities, but also potential convex
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quadratic costs that affect market prices. As discussed below, these market characteristics are
particularly important in deregulated electricity markets with high penetration of renewable
energy sources.
In electricity deregulated markets (see, e.g., O’Neill et al., 2005; Ruiz et al., 2012), a
market operator or individual system operator (ISO) receives information about generation
constraints, marginal generation costs, and fixed commitment costs, from generators partici-
pating in the market. Based on this information, the ISO decides the generators that should
be committed in the market, as well as their appropriate compensation.
Due to the electricity market non-convexities related to start-up/shut-down costs and
minimum output requirements (among others), it is difficult for ISOs to obtain the appro-
priate compensation values for committed generators. One way in which ISOs can obtain
an estimate of the correct compensation values is by finding the shadow (dual) prices asso-
ciated to the linear programming relaxation (cf., Conforti et al., 2014) of the mixed-integer
linear program (MILP) (cf., Conforti et al., 2014) associated to the market’s unit commit-
ment problem (UC) (cf., Hobbs et al., 2006). The generators’ compensation values are then
computed by adding uplift payments (cf., Jayantilal et al., 2001). However, these uplift
payments may be significant enough to modify the suppliers’ incentives (Liberopoulos and
Andrianesis, 2016). To address this issue, a number of alternative pricing schemes have been
recently developed by Bjørndal and Jo¨rnsten (2008); Garcıa et al. (2006); Hogan and Ring
(2003); Liberopoulos and Andrianesis (2016); O’Neill et al. (2005); Ruiz et al. (2012), among
others (see, Liberopoulos and Andrianesis, 2016, for a recent review). However, to the best
of our knowledge, none of these approaches directly consider potential ramping costs in the
electricity market.
The penetration of renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, and wave energy into the
electricity market has been steadily increasing. The U.S. Energy Information Administration
estimates that in the U.S., the percentage of energy generated from renewable energy sources
has increased from 9.5% in 2006 to 13.3% in 2015. As a result, ISO’s commitment decisions
require conventional generators to ramp up or down regularly due to the variability in the
power that renewable sources can provide throughout a given day (see, e.g., Sioshansi and
Short, 2009). At the same time, ramping results in substantial wear and tear costs (see,
e.g., Lew et al., 2012). Therefore, considering these ramping costs in the computation of
compensation values is becoming necessary to provide adequate settlement prices for the
different generators in the electricity market.
In order to take into account ramping costs in the electricity market, we extend the
seminal results introduced by O’Neill et al. (2005) to obtain appropriate prices in markets
with non-convexities. O’Neill et al. (2005) show that after solving the MILP associated
with the ISO’s UC; the desired clearing prices can be obtained from the shadow prices of the
demand and capacity constraints of the linear program resulting from fixing the commitment
(binary) variables of the ISO’s UC to their optimal value.
Here, we extend this approach by considering ramping costs (or in more generality,
quadratic convex costs) into the formulation of the unit commitment problem. Then, using
convex optimization techniques (cf., Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004), we obtain the market-
clearing prices in the presence of ramping costs from the dual variables values (shadow prices)
associated with the optimal solution of an appropriate convex optimization problem. That
is, one obtains a set of prices that satisfy the market equilibrium conditions in which sup-
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pliers would not want to change their energy dispatch at these prices. With these results in
hand, we perform numerical experiments to show the impact of ramping costs on the clearing
prices of a market with non-convexities.
To make the article more self-contained, we introduce some of the basic convex optimiza-
tion tools used in the article and provide appropriate references for further relevant results
in this area.
The pricing results are mainly motivated by an ISO looking to obtain clearing prices
in an electricity market with renewable energy sources. However, following O’Neill et al.
(2005), we use the general formulation of a bidding market in which the auctioneer is buying
and/or selling a commodity, and has an objective of maximizing the value to bidders, when
potential quadratic commodity costs (e.g., in a labor market (Bentolila and Saint-Paul,
1992)) or quadratic transaction costs (e.g., in a finance market (Brown and Smith, 2011;
Olivares-Nadal and DeMiguel, 2015) are present in the market).
It is worth to mention that related advances on obtaining market-clearing prices in
markets with non-convexities have been done recently. For example, consider the work
of: Zoltowska (2016), who considers demand shifting bids and transmission constraints in
the market; Ye et al. (2015), who consider, from the point of view of the customer, non-
convexities arising when considering flexible demand options (e.g., the option to forgo de-
mand); Van Vyve et al. (2011), who propose a new model to obtain prices in a market
with non-convexities by combining the approaches used in both the US and European elec-
tricity markets; and Muatore (2008), who proposes an algorithm to find market-clearing
prices in markets with non-convexities that provide incentives to both maintain and increase
generating capacity.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the market’s
assignment problem in the presence of convex quadratic costs. Furthermore, we generalize
the results of O’Neill et al. (2005) to obtain clearing prices for the market. In Section 3, we
illustrate our results by computing and analyzing the clearing prices associated to Scarf’s
classical market problem (Scarf, 1994) when potential ramping costs are taken into account.
In Section 4, we finish with some concluding remarks.
2 Market problem with convex quadratic costs
Consider a bidding market, where the auctioneer is buying and/or selling a commodity,
and has an objective of maximizing the value to bidders, when potential transaction convex
quadratic costs are present in the market. Following O’Neill et al. (2005), the market’s assign-
ment problem can be formulated as the following mixed-integer quadratic program (MIQP)
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(cf., Lazimy, 1982):
p∗MIQP = min
n∑
k=1
ckxk + dkzk + rk(xk − x0k)2
s.t.
n∑
k=1
akxk = b0,
gkxk + hkzk ≥ bk, k = 1, . . . , n,
zk ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, . . . , n,
xk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n,
(1)
where for any market bidder k = 1, . . . , n: xk ∈ R+ represents the units of commodity
provided by the bidder; zk ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the bidder is committed to provide
units of commodity; ck, dk ∈ R, are respectively the variable and fixed costs associated with
the bidder’s activities; ak ∈ R reflects the production or demand characteristics of the bidder
in the market-clearing constraint
∑n
k=1 akxk = b0, where b0 ∈ R is the amount of commodity
to be auctioned, with b0 6= 0 in a one-sided auction and b0 = 0 in a two-sided auction;
gk, hk ∈ R reflect restrictions on the bidder’s operations (e.g., production of a particular
plant is limited to the capacity of that plant); bk ∈ R represents the right hand sides of the
internal constraints of the bidder. Also, in an extension of the market assignment problem
in O’Neill et al. (2005, Sec. 5), rk ∈ R+ denotes the quadratic costs associated with the
deviation of the commodity provided by bidder k = 1, . . . , n from a target or previous
commodity production level x0k ∈ R. The parameters rk ∈ R+, x0k ∈ R can also be used to
model quadratic commodity costs, as well as quadratic transaction costs.
Notice that by assuming that rk ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . , n, one ensures that (1) has a convex
quadratic objective. Also, note that if rk = 0 for k = 1, . . . , n, problem (1) is equivalent
to the PIP problem in O’Neill et al. (2005, Sec. 5) when bidders are assumed to provide a
single commodity. This single-commodity assumption is made here for ease of presentation
and to identify the commodity with power in electricity markets. However, all the results
presented thereof extend in straightforward fashion to the more general multi-commodity
market considered in O’Neill et al. (2005).
In what follows, we assume that problem (1) is feasible; that is, there is an assignment of
the bidders that satisfies both the operating constraints of the bidders as well as the market-
clearing constraint. Also, without loss of generality, we assume that ak 6= 0, k = 1, . . . , n
(i.e., bidders that do not contribute to the market-clearing are not considered), and rk > 0,
k = 1, . . . , n (i.e., bidders that do not incur ramping costs do not need a corresponding
quadratic constraint in formulation (2) below).
By introducing the auxiliary variables yk ∈ R+, k = 1, . . . , n, the market assignment
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problem (1) can be reformulated as:
p∗MIQP = min
n∑
k=1
ckxk + dkzk + rkyk
s.t.
n∑
k=1
akxk = b0,
gkxk + hkzk ≥ bk, k = 1, . . . , n,
yk ≥ (xk − x0k)2, k = 1, . . . , n,
zk ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, . . . , n,
xk, yk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n.
(2)
This follows from the fact that for any optimal solution of (2), the constraints yk ≥ (xk−x0k)2,
k = 1, . . . , n, will be tight. Now let Kn+1 ⊆ Rn+1 denote the second-order (or Lorentz)
cone (cf., Alizadeh and Goldfarb, 2003) in dimension n+ 1; that is,
Kn+1 = {(w0, w) ∈ Rn+1 : w0 ≥ ‖(w1, w2, . . . , wn)‖2}, (3)
where ‖ · ‖2 represents the Euclidean norm. Note that like Rn or Rn+, the cone Kn+1 is a
closed convex cone (cf., Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 2001). Moreover, Rn, Rn+, Kn+1 are self-
dual cones; that is, (Rn)∗ = Rn, (Rn+)∗ = Rn+, (Kn+1)∗ = Kn+1, where for any convex set,
the dual cone of S ⊆ Rn is equal to S∗ = {u ∈ Rn : uᵀw ≥ 0 for all w ∈ S}. Here, for
any u,w ∈ Rn, uᵀw = ∑ni=1 uiwi denotes the usual inner product in Rn. The self-duality
of Rn, Rn+, and Kn+1 will be key in deriving an appropriate dual problem associated with
the continuous relaxation (i.e., when zi ∈ {0, 1} is replaced by zi ∈ [0, 1] for k = 1, . . . , n) of
problem (2).
From the definition (3), it is not difficult to see (cf., Lobo et al., 1997, eq. (7)) that for
any k = 1, . . . , n,
yk ≥ (xk − x0k)2 ⇔
(
yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(xk − x0k)
) ∈ K3.
Thus, problem (2) can be reformulated as the following mixed-integer second-order cone
program (MISOCP) (Terlaky, 2013):
p∗MISOCP = min
n∑
k=1
ckxk + dkzk + rkyk
s.t.
n∑
k=1
akxk = b0,
gkxk + hkzk ≥ bk, k = 1, . . . , n,
(yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(xk − x0k)) ∈ K3, k = 1, . . . , n,
zk ∈ {0, 1}, k = 1, . . . , n,
xk, yk, zk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n.
(4)
Like problem (4) above, a MISOCP is an optimization problem that besides a linear objec-
tive and linear constraints, has second-order cone constraints, as well as integer or binary
variables. Problems with second-order cone constraints are widely used in applications in
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engineering and science. In particular, this type of constraints appear in structural design
problems (Lobo et al., 1997, Sec. 3.5), electrical engineering (Bienstock et al., 2014; Lubin
et al., 2016), healthcare (Mak et al., 2014), and supply chain management (Atamtu¨rk et al.,
2012). In many instances, this is a result of the need to take into account the uncertainty of
problem parameters and obtain solutions that are robust; that is, perform well in different
scenarios (see, e.g., Mak et al., 2014). Moreover the solution of MISOCP problems can be
obtained using MISOCP solvers like MOSEK, CPLEX, and Gurobi.
Similar to O’Neill et al. (2005), we next use the optimal solution of (4) to obtain the
shadow (dual) prices associated with the market-clearing and bidder operational constraints
in (4). Namely, let
z∗ = argminz∈{0,1}n{(4)}; (5)
that is, z∗ ∈ {0, 1}n is the vector of optimal values of the binary variables in (4). After
replacing zk = z
∗
k, k = 1, . . . , n in (4), we obtain the following second-order conic program
(SOCP) (cf., Lobo et al., 1997):
p∗SOCP = min
n∑
k=1
ckxk + dkzk + rkyk
s.t.
n∑
k=1
akxk = b0, (p0)
gkxk + hkzk ≥ bk, (qk) k = 1, . . . , n,
(yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(xk − x0k)) ∈ K3, (γk, αk, βk) k = 1, . . . , n,
zk = z
∗
k, (pk) k = 1, . . . , n,
xk, yk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n.
(6)
Like problem (6) above, a SOCP is an optimization problem that besides a linear objective
and linear constraints, has second-order cone constraints. The key characteristic of SOCPs
that will be exploited here, is the fact that SOCPs are convex optimization problems. This
follows from the fact that the second-order cone constraint (w0, w) ∈ Kn+1 is a convex
constraint. As a result, there is a rich duality theory (which generalizes linear programming
duality) for these problems, as well as polynomial-time solution algorithms (cf., Alizadeh
and Goldfarb, 2003). In turn, these algorithms can be used together with branch & bound
techniques (cf., Conforti et al., 2014) to solve MISOCP problems like (4).
Notice that in (6), we have associated the dual variables: p0 with the market-clearing
constraint, qk with the k-th bidder’s operation constraint, pk with the k-th bidder’s com-
mitment constraint, and (γk, αk, βk) with the k-th second-order constraint, for k = 1, . . . , n.
Also, for ease of notation, let u ∈ Rn represent the vector of variables uk, k = 1, . . . , n. With
this notation (cf., Alizadeh and Goldfarb, 2003), the dual SOCP corresponding to the primal
SOCP problem (6) can be obtained by constructing the lagrangean dual of (6). Namely, let
L(x, y, z, p0, p, q, γ, α, β) =
n∑
k=1
Lk(xk, yk, zk, p0, pk, qk, γk, αk, βk), (7)
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where
Lk(xk, · · · , βk) = ckxk + dkzk + rkyk + p0( 1kb0 − akxk)− qk(gkxk + hkzk − bk)
+pk(z
∗
k − zk)− (yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(xk − x0k))ᵀ(γk, αk, βk)
= (ck − akp0 − gkqk − 2βk)xk + (dk − hkqk − pk)zk
+(rk − γk − αk)yk + 1kb0p0 + bkqk + z∗kpk − γk + αk + 2βkx0k,
(8)
for k = 1, . . . , n, where p0 ∈ (R)∗ = R, q ∈ (Rn+)∗ = Rn+, p ∈ (Rn)∗ = Rn, and (γk, αk, βk) ∈
(K3)∗ = K3, for all k = 1, . . . , n, are the dual variables or lagrangian multipliers associated
to each of the constraints in problem (6).
From (7) and (8), it follows that the dual problem of (6):
max
p0 ∈ R, p ∈ Rn, q ∈ Rn+,
(γk, αk, βk) ∈ K3, k = 1, . . . , n
min
x≥0,y≥0,z≥0
L(x, y, z, p, q, u, v, w, γ, α, β),
is equivalent to
d∗SOCP = max b0p0 +
n∑
k=1
(
bkqk + z
∗
kpk − γk + αk + 2βkx0k
)
s.t. ck − akp0 − gkqk − 2βk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n,
dk − hkqk − pk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n,
rk − γk − αk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n,
(γk, αk, βk) ∈ K3, k = 1, . . . , n,
qk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n.
(9)
In Proposition 1 below, we show that strong duality holds between (6) and (9), and that
their optimal objectives are attained. For this purpose, we introduce, for any set S ⊆ Rn
the notion of its interior; that is, int(S) = {w ∈ S : for any u ∈ Rn, there exists  >
0, such that w + u ∈ S}.
Proposition 1. Assume that (1) is feasible, and ak 6= 0, ck ≥ 0, rk > 0, for all k = 1, . . . , n.
Then
p∗MIQP = p
∗
MISOCP = p
∗
SOCP = d
∗
SOCP.
Proof. From the discussion above, it is clear that problems (1), (4), and (6) are equivalent.
Therefore, p∗MIQP = p
∗
MISOCP = p
∗
SOCP. It then remains to show both p
∗
SOCP and d
∗
SOCP are
attained and strong duality holds between (6) and (9); that is, p∗SOCP = d
∗
SOCP. For this
purpose, we first show that both (6) and (9) are strictly feasible (cf., Alizadeh and Goldfarb,
2003).
Notice that from the feasibility of (1), the fact that the feasible set of (1) is closed,
and that the objective of (1) is bounded below by min{0, kmink=1,...,n{dk}}, it follows from
Weierstrass’ Theorem that (1) has an optimal solution. Let x∗ ∈ Rn+, z∗ ∈ {0, 1}n be the
optimal solution of (1), and consider any vector y ∈ Rn+ such that yk > (x∗k − x0k)2, for
k = 1, . . . , n. It is easy to see that (x∗, y, z∗) ∈ R2n+ × {0, 1}n is feasible to (6). Furthermore,
we have that
yk + 1 > ‖(yk − 1, 2(x∗k − x0k))‖2,
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for k = 1, . . . , n. Thus, (x∗, y, z∗) ∈ R2n+ × {0, 1}n is a strictly feasible solution for (6); that
is, (x∗, y, z∗) ∈ R2n+ × {0, 1}n is feasible for (6), and (yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(x∗k − x0k)) ∈ int(K3),
k = 1, . . . , n. Thus, problem (6) is strictly feasible. Now consider the assignment
p0 = mink=1,...,n
{
ck−gk
ak
}
,
(pk, qk, γk, αk, βk) =
(
dk − hk − 1, 1, 12rk, 14rk,−14rk
)
,
(10)
for k = 1, . . . , n. Clearly, (10) is feasible for (9), with
γk =
1
2
rk >
1
2
√
2
rk = ‖(αk, βk)‖2,
for k = 1, . . . , n. That is, (10) is a feasible solution for (9), and (γk, αk, βk) ∈ int(K3),
k = 1, . . . , n. Thus, problem (9) is strictly feasible. The result then follows from SOCP
duality (see, e.g., Alizadeh and Goldfarb, 2003, Thm. 13).
Now let us consider the individual problems associated to the bidders in the market. For
each bidder k = 1, . . . , n, let t0 be the unit commodity price and tk be the price reflecting the
commitment action offered to individual k by the auctioneer. Define the following problem,
min ckxk + dkzk + rk(xk − x0k)2 − t0(akxk)− tkzk
s.t. gkxk + hkzk ≥ bk,
xk ≥ 0,
zk ∈ {0, 1};
which similar to problem (1) is equivalent to the following MISOCP:
p∗MISOCPk(t0, tk) = min ckxk + dkzk + rkyk − t0(akxk)− tkzk
s.t. gkxk + hkzk ≥ bk,
(yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(xk − x0k)) ∈ K3,
xk, yk ≥ 0,
zk ∈ {0, 1}.
(11)
Similar to O’Neill et al. (2005), below we define both the market-clearing prices and associ-
ated market-clearing contracts between the auctioneer and the bidders.
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium for the market is a set of prices {t∗0, t∗k} and allo-
cations {x∗k, z∗k}, such that
(a) At the prices {t∗0, t∗k}, the allocations {x∗k, z∗k} solve (11) for all k = 1, . . . , n;
(b) The market clears:
∑n
k=1 akx
∗
k = b0.
Definition 2. Let Tk be a contract between the auctioneer and bidder k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with
the following terms:
(a) Bidder k operates following zk = z
∗
k, xk = x
∗
k.
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(b) Bidder k receives an amount from the auctioneer that is equal to the following payment:
p∗0akxk + p
∗
kzk.
In what follows, we refer to T = {Tk for k = 1, . . . , n}, to describe the market-clearing
contracts between the auctioneer and the bidders. Below, we provide the main result of
the article; namely, a characterization of the market-clearing prices for a market with non-
convexities and convex quadratic costs.
Theorem 2.1. Assume that (1) is feasible, and ak 6= 0, ck ≥ 0, rk > 0, for all k =
1, . . . , n. Let {x∗k, y∗k, z∗k} for all k = 1, . . . , n be an optimal solution to (1). Also, let p∗0,
and {p∗k, q∗k, γ∗k, α∗k, β∗k} for all k = 1, . . . , n be an optimal solution to (9). If in (11) we define
t0 = p
∗
0 and tk = p
∗
k for all k = 1, . . . , n, then the prices {p∗0, p∗k} and allocations {x∗k, z∗k} for
all k = 1, . . . , n represent a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Note that {x∗k, y∗k, z∗k} for all k = 1, . . . , n is also an optimal solution of (6). From the
KKT conditions associated to the optimal solutions of both (6) and (9), it follows that:
0 ≤ (ck − akp∗0 − gkq∗k − 2β∗k)⊥x∗k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n, (12)
0 ≤ (dk − hkq∗k − p∗k)⊥z∗k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n,
0 ≤ (rk − γ∗k − α∗k)⊥y∗k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n, (13)
0 = p∗0(b0 −
n∑
k=1
akx
∗
k),
0 ≤ q∗k⊥(gkx∗k + hkz∗k − bk) ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , n, (14)
0 = p∗k(z
′
k − z∗k), k = 1, . . . , n,
(y∗k + 1, y
∗
k − 1, 2(x∗k − x0k))⊥(γ∗k, α∗k, β∗k), k = 1, . . . , n, (15)
where the notation u⊥w, for u,w ∈ R denotes the complementary slackness between u
and w. Now consider the following problem under the contract T ; that is, each individual
bidder k is offered prices {p∗0, p∗k}, then each participant k = 1, . . . , n will solve (11) with
t0 = p
∗
0, tk = p
∗
k, k = 1, . . . , n to minimize their operation cost. That is, each bidder will
solve
p∗MISOCPk(p
∗
0, p
∗
k) = min ckxk + dkzk + rkyk − p∗0(akxk)− p∗kzk
s.t. gkxk + hkzk ≥ bk,
(yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(xk − x0k)) ∈ K3,
xk, yk ≥ 0,
zk ∈ {0, 1}.
(16)
Clearly, (xk, yk, zk) = (x
∗
k, y
∗
k, z
∗
k) is feasible for (16), and the objective value of this solution,
denoted pˆMISOCPk(p
∗
0, p
∗
k), is
pˆMISOCPk(p
∗
0, p
∗
k) =ckx
∗
k + dkz
∗
k + rky
∗
k − p∗0akx∗k − p∗kz∗k.
9
Using the complementarity equations (13), (14), and (15), it follows that
pˆMISOCPk(p
∗
0, p
∗
k) =ckx
∗
k + dkz
∗
k + rky
∗
k − p∗0akx∗k − p∗kz∗k − q∗k(gkx∗k + hkz∗k − bk)
− (rk − γ∗k − α∗k)y∗k − (y∗k + 1, y∗k − 1, 2(x∗k − x0k))ᵀ(γ∗k, α∗k, β∗k),
=(ck − akp∗0 − gkq∗k − 2β∗k)x∗k + (dk − p∗k − hkq∗k)z∗k + y∗k(γ∗k + α∗k)
− (y∗kγ∗k + γ∗k + y∗kα∗k − α∗k − 2β∗kx0k),
=q∗kbk − γ∗k + α∗k + 2β∗kx0k.
Next we show that (xk, yk, zk) = (x
∗
k, y
∗
k, z
∗
k) is the optimal solution for problem (16). Let
(xk, yk, zk) ∈ R2+ × {0, 1} be a feasible solution of (16). It follows that gkxk + hkzk − bk ≥ 0,
yk ≥ 0 and (yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(xk − x0k)) ∈ K3. Therefore
q∗k(gkxk + hkzk − bk) ≥ 0
yk(rk − γ∗k − α∗k) ≥ 0,
(yk + 1, yk − 1, 2(xk − x0k))ᵀ(γ∗k, α∗k, β∗k) ≥ 0,
(17)
since the feasibility of p∗0, and {p∗k, q∗k, γ∗k, α∗k, β∗k} for all k = 1, . . . , n, for (9) ensures that
q∗k ≥ 0, rk − γ∗k − α∗k ≥ 0, and (γ∗k, α∗k, β∗k) ∈ K3 = (K3)∗. Also, from the fact that p∗0, and
{p∗k, q∗k, γ∗k, α∗k, β∗k} for all k = 1, . . . , n is feasible for (9), xk, zk ∈ R+, it follows that:
(ck − akp∗0 − gkq∗k − 2β∗k)xk ≥ 0,
(dk − hkq∗k − p∗k)zk ≥ 0.
(18)
Now let pMISOCPk denote the objective value of (16) associated with the feasible solution
(xk, yk, zk) ∈ R2+ × {0, 1}; that is
pMISOCPk = ckxk + dkzk + rkyk − p∗0akxk − p∗kzk.
Using (17) and then (18), we have
pMISOCPk ≥ ckxk + dkzk + rkyk − p∗0akxk − p∗kzk − q∗k(gkxk + hkzk − bk)
−yk(rk − γ∗k − α∗k)− (ykγ∗k + γ∗k + ykα∗k − α∗k + 2β∗kxk − 2β∗kx0k)
= (ck − akp∗0 − gkq∗k − 2β∗k)xk + (dk − hkq∗k − p∗k)zk + q∗kbk − γ∗k + α∗k + 2β∗kx0k
≥ q∗kbk − γ∗k + α∗k + 2β∗kx0k
= pˆMISOCPk(p
∗
0, p
∗
k).
This shows that (x∗k, y
∗
k, z
∗
k) is the optimal solution for (16). Furthermore, the solution
(x∗k, y
∗
k, z
∗
k) satisfies the market-clearing condition
∑n
k=1 akx
∗
k = b0, therefore, (x
∗
k, y
∗
k, z
∗
k) will
provide a market-clearing allocation.
3 Scarf’s market instance
As an example of a market with non-convexities, consider a problem proposed by Scarf
(1994). The objective is to minimize the total cost while satisfying the demand in an elec-
tricity market. Two types of plants are available to provide the electricity in the market.
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(type 1 plant) (type 2 plant)
Characteristics Smokestack High Tech
Capacity 16.00 7.00
Construction cost 53.00 30.00
Marginal cost 3.00 2.00
Average cost at capacity 6.31 6.28
Total cost at capacity 101.00 44.00
Table 3.1: Characteristics of Smokestack and High Tech plants (O’Neill et al., 2005).
The characteristics of each type of plant, including costs and operational constraints are
summarized in Table 3.1.
Scarf’s market problem can be formulated as the following mixed-integer linear program
min
5∑
i=1
(3x1i + 53z1i) +
10∑
j=1
(2x2j + 30z2j)
s.t.
5∑
i=1
x1i +
10∑
j=1
x2j = D,
x1i − 16z1i ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , 5,
x2j − 7z2j ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , 10,
x1i, x2j ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 5, j = 1, . . . , 10,
z1i, z2j ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , 5, j = 1, . . . , 10,
(19)
where D is the total demand. The market-clearing price for this problem has been studied
in O’Neill et al. (2005). Table 3.2 summerizes the optimal solution of (19) for different values
of the demand. It is clear that as the demand increases, the number of plants of different
types used can change dramatically. For example, when the demand is 56, all type 1 plants
are closed and eight (8) type 2 plants are open; however, when the demand is 60, two (2)
type 1 plants are open while now only four (4) type 2 plants are open. The market-clearing
prices in Table 3.3 are obtained from the dual (shadow) prices of the linear program obtained
from (19) by fixing its binary variables to their optimal value (cf., O’Neill et al., 2005). Note
that for all the instances with different demand, the market-clearing prices remain the same.
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Units of type Unit’s output
Demand 1 2 1 2 Total Cost
56 0 8 0 56 352
58 1 6 16 42 365
60 2 4 32 28 378
62 3 2 48 14 391
64 4 0 64 0 404
66 2 5 31 35 419
68 3 3 47 21 432
70 0 10 0 70 440
Table 3.2: Optimal solution of Scarf’s market problem (19) (O’Neill et al., 2005).
Commodity Price Plant 1 Start-up Price Plant 2 Start-up Price
3 53 23
Table 3.3: Market-clearing price of Scarf’s problem.
Now we consider a modified Scarf problem with quadratic ramping costs,
min
5∑
i=1
(3x1i + 53z1i + r1(x1i − x01i)2)
+
10∑
j=1
(2x2j + 30z2j + r2(x2j − x02j)2)
s.t.
5∑
i=1
x1i +
10∑
j=1
x2j = D,
x1i − 16z1i ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . , 5,
x2j − 7z2j ≤ 0, j = 1, . . . , 10,
x1i, x2j ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , 5, j = 1, . . . , 10,
z1i, z2j ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , 5, j = 1, . . . , 10,
(20)
where x01i, x
0
2j, for all i = 1, . . . , 5, j = 1, . . . , 10, are set to be the optimal unit’s generation
obtained after solving (19) with a demand D = 55. The quadratic terms in the objective
function can be interpreted as the ramping costs of moving from the original output plan set
from (19) with a demand D = 55. It is clear that if we set D = 55 in (20), then no matter
what the values of r1, r2 are, problem (20) will have the same optimal solution.
After setting r1 = r2 = 0.1, we can see from Table 3.4 that in most cases, the number
of type 1 plants and type 2 plants with full capacity remain the same as a result of the
ramping costs (in contrast with Table 3.2). Note that as the demand increases, a type 2
plant with partial capacity is opened for production. Table 3.5 summarizes the market-
clearing prices obtained using the results in Section 2. In order to maintain a competitive
equilibrium, the market-clearing prices vary from case to case. In contrast with the start-up
prices obtained by O’Neill et al. (2005), note that from the results of Table 3.5, it follows that
the start-up price can differ for type 2 plants producing at full capacity, and type 2 plants
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producing at partial capacity. Specifically, the start-up price of type 2 plants producing at
full capacity changes with the demand, while the start-up price of type-2 plants producing
at partial capacity remains the same for demands between 56 to 68. The start-up price for
closed type 2 plants is the same as the price for type 2 plants with full capacity. The unit
commodity price varies in a small range but it does not remain the same. The start-up price
for all type 1 plants remains mostly equal to 53, but this price is different for some demand
levels (e.g., compare D = 60 and D = 62).
Type 1 Output Type 2 Output
Partial Full Partial Full Cost
Demand No. Prod. No. Prod. No. Prod. No. Prod. Ramp Total
56 3 45.00 0 0 1 4.00 1 7 1.90 377.90
58 3 46.50 0 0 1 4.50 1 7 2.10 383.60
60 0 0 3 48 1 5.00 1 7 2.50 389.50
62 0 0 3 48 1 7.00 1 7 4.90 395.90
64 3 47.40 0 0 2 9.60 1 7 4.62 429.02
66 0 0 3 48 2 11.00 1 7 6.05 435.05
68 0 0 3 48 2 13.00 1 7 8.45 441.45
70 1 15.00 3 48 0 0 1 7 22.50 467.50
Table 3.4: Optimal solution of modified Scarf’s problem with r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.1.
Plant 1 Start-up Price Plant 2 Start-up Price
Demand Unit Price Partial Full & Closed Partial Full & Closed
56 2.80 53.00 53.00 30 24.40
58 2.90 53.00 53.00 30 23.70
60 3.00 53.00 53.00 30 23.00
62 3.40 46.60 46.60 30 20.20
64 2.96 53.00 53.00 30 23.28
66 3.10 51.40 51.40 30 22.30
68 3.30 48.20 48.20 30 20.90
70 6.00 53.00 5.00 2 2.00
Table 3.5: Market-clearing price of modified Scarf’s problem with r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.1.
Tables 3.6 and Table 3.7 show that after setting r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.3 in (20), similar
conclusions as in the case r1 = r2 = 0.1 can be reached. However, with a higher ramping
cost on type 2 plants, we can see that with demand values between 64 to 68, instead of
operating one more type 2 plant to satisfy the demand, the optimal solution suggests to
operate an additional type 1 plant instead.
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 graphically compare the solutions obtained from the three cases
discussed thus far; that is when r1 = r2 = 0, when r1 = r2 = 0.1, and when r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.3.
Next we consider an extreme case where the parameter of ramping cost is relatively large.
With r1 = r2 = 1, similar analysis can be applied from the analysis with r1 = r2 = 0.1.
However, with a relative large ramping cost parameter, the unit commodity price as well
as start-up price can change dramatically. It is interesting to see that when the demand
becomes 58, the start-up prices for type 1 plant, type 2 plant with full capacity and closed
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Type 1 Output Type 2 Output
Partial Full Partial Full Cost
Demand No. Prod. No. Prod. No. Prod. No. Prod. Ramping Total
56 3 47.4 0 0 1 1.6 1 7 0.78 379.18
58 0 0 3 48 1 3.0 1 7 2.70 385.70
60 0 0 3 48 1 5.0 1 7 7.50 394.50
62 0 0 3 48 0 0 2 14 14.70 405.70
64 1 9.0 3 48 0 0 1 7 4.62 435.10
66 1 11.0 3 48 0 0 1 7 12.10 445.10
68 1 13.0 3 48 0 0 1 7 16.90 455.90
70 1 15.0 3 48 0 0 1 7 22.50 467.50
Table 3.6: Optimal solution of modified Scarf’s problem with r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.3.
Start-up Compensation
Type 1 Output Type 2 Output
Demand Unit Price Partial Full & Closed Partial Full & Closed
56 2.96 53.00 53.00 30.00 23.28
58 3.80 40.20 40.20 30.00 17.40
60 5.00 21.00 21.00 30.00 9.00
62 6.20 1.80 1.80 30.00 0.60
64 4.80 53.00 24.20 10.40 10.40
66 5.20 53.00 17.80 7.60 7.60
68 5.60 53.00 11.40 4.80 4.80
70 6.00 53.00 5.00 2.00 2.00
Table 3.7: Market-clearing price of modified Scarf’s problem with r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.3.
Type 1 Output Type 2 Output
Partial Full Partial Full Cost
Demand No. Prod. No. Prod. No. Prod. No. Prod. Ramp Total
56 0 0 3 48 1 1 1 7 1.0 380.0
58 0 0 3 48 1 3 1 7 9.0 392.0
60 0 0 3 48 1 5 1 7 25.0 412.0
62 0 0 3 48 1 7 1 7 49.0 440.0
64 0 0 3 48 2 9 1 7 40.5 465.5
66 0 0 3 48 2 11 1 7 60.5 489.5
68 0 0 3 48 2 13 1 7 84.5 517.5
70 0 0 3 48 3 15 1 7 75.0 542.0
Table 3.8: Optimal solution of modified Scarf’s problem with r1 = r2 = 1.
type 2 plant are negative, which means these plants need to pay instead of getting paid to
open in exchange for a very high commodity price (compared with Table 3.3 and Table 3.5).
Now consider the case in which r1 = r2 = 1 and D = 60 in (20), as an example to
illustrate that the dual prices obtained by using the methodology of Section 2, result in a
competitive equilibrium. For any j = 1, . . . , n, the individual problem for a type 2 plant j
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of optimal solution of (20) for different values of ramping costs r1, r2
(r1 = 0, r2 = 0 indicates no ramping costs).
committed by the central operator to produce at partial capacity is
min 2x2j + 30z2j + (x2j − 0)2 − 12x2j − 30z2j
s.t. x2j − 7z2j ≤ 0,
x2j ≥ 0,
z2j ∈ {0, 1},
and its optimal solution is (x∗2j, z
∗
2j) = (5, 1), which matches the optimal solution in Table 3.8.
It is not difficult to check, given the dual prices in Table 3.9, that the optimal solution for
every individual problem matches its corresponding solution in Table 3.8, verifying Theo-
rem 2.1.
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Figure 3.2: Unit commodity prices obtained from the solution of (20), for different values of
ramping costs r1, r2 (r1 = 0, r2 = 0 indicates no ramping costs).
Plant 1 Start-up Price Plant 2 Start-up Price
Demand Unit Price Partial Full & Closed Partial Full & Closed
56 4 37 37 30 16
58 8 -27 -27 30 -12
60 12 -91 -91 30 -40
62 16 -155 -155 30 -68
64 11 -75 -75 30 -33
66 13 -107 -107 30 -47
68 15 -139 -139 30 -61
70 12 -91 -91 30 -40
Table 3.9: Market-clearing price of modified Scarf’s problem with r1 = r2 = 1.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the problem of obtaining appropriate market-clearing prices
when the market has both non-convexities and convex quadratic costs. Our results show
that by using convex optimization techniques, the seminal work of O’Neill et al. (2005)
on pricing in markets with non-convexity, can be extended to markets in which both non-
convexities and convex quadratic costs arise. In the electrical market these two market
features arise due to generator fixed costs (or other operational constraints), and ramping or
quadratic generation costs. Considering both of these features in the electricity market have
become increasingly important due the high penetration of renewable energy sources (RES).
This is due to the output volatility of RES, which requires conventional generators to ramp
up or down more frequently. Besides electricity markets non-convexity features appear in
other markets such as the financial and labor market (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992; Brown
and Smith, 2011). Thus our results have an impact in a wide range of potential markets.
Furthermore, we believe that the techniques outlined here can be used to extend other
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pricing methodologies for markets with non-convexities (Liberopoulos and Andrianesis, 2016,
see,) that aim to obtain prices with different characteristics. Finally, in the context of
electricity markets, it is natural to consider how the consideration of ramping costs will affect
prices in an electrical network with congested lines. Addressing these questions provides
interesting directions for future research work in this area.
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